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THE ERA OF CONTRACT AGRICULTURE
— by Neil E. Harl*
The signs of increasing use of contracts are everywhere—especially on the production
side of agriculture.1 Specialty grains, feeder livestock, even vegetables, are being
produced under contract and have for some time.  So what's the concern about the rising
tide of contract agriculture?  Basically, the concern is the possible shift in bargaining
power as input suppliers gain greater economic power at the expense of producers.2
Concentration in seed companies
Mergers, alliances and various other forms of arrangements are reducing the number
of players in input supply, particularly in seeds, and increasing the level of
concentration.
But that's not the entire story.  The revolution in ownership of germ plasm, the feature
of cells that determines the characteristics of offspring, also is moving rapidly toward
concentration in a few hands.  The high-profile alliance (and now merger) between
DuPont and Pioneer Hi-Bred International, the Monsanto acquisition of DeKalb and the
Monsanto acquisition of Delta and Pine Land Company are recent examples of how the
ownership and control of genetic material in crops are falling into the hands of a few,
economically powerful players.  Increased concentration is also leading to control by a
few firms over the major processes by which genetic manipulation occurs, thus enabling
those controlling the technologies to block use by other firms.
This development is partly related to the changing role of the land grant universities ,
partly to the ability in recent years to manipulate germ plasm through genetic
engineering, and partly to the consequence of the ability to obtain a monopoly-like
position over unique life forms and over the process of genetic manipulation.
•  For decades the land grant universities developed the basic genetic lines and made
those lines available to the seed industry.  Because of limitations on university funding
and the near-revolution in genetic engineering, the private sector began pouring more
money into basic research.
•  The advent of genetic engineering meant that scientists could manipulate genetic
composition—not through conventional crop breeding techniques but through
laboratory procedures—to change the genetic makeup of plant and animal life.  That has
produced herbicide-resistant crops, for example.
•  Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1980 landmark case determined that life forms
could be patented.3  In addition to federal Plant Variety Protection (PVP)4 and simply
shrouding research efforts with secrecy, the ability to patent life forms provides a
powerful tool to keep competitors at bay.
Effect of contracts
So what effect will concentration in the seed business and control by the few resulting
firms over germ plasm likely have on contract negotiations with producers?  It depends
on the options open to producers who don't like the terms of contracts offered to them.
With numerous contract possibilities available from input suppliers, each offering
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inputs of roughly equal productivity and cost, the answer is
perhaps "not much."
But if there are just a few options, with the next best offering
a much less attractive set of inputs in terms of cost and
productivity, the answer is "take what you're offered."  The
outcome is likely to be a tilting in the terms of contracts in
favor of the input supplier.  The division of revenue from
production would be expected to shift over time in favor of the
party with the monopoly or near-monopoly position.  Seed
companies and other input suppliers can be expected to drive
the best possible bargain which means, in the case of seed,
capturing the greatest possible percentage of the value from any
yield premium.
•  The outcome would be a smaller share of the revenue from
production going to the producer, resulting in less
compensation to the producer and less to capitalize into land
values.
•  Seed companies would end up with a larger share of the pie
with more to capitalize into the stock of the input supply firms.
Even if unique corn derivatives produce revenue of $2 million
per acre, it's fairly clear that whomever holds the rights to the
technology involved will capture the lion's share of the revenue,
not the producer.
A good argument can be made that this perception of potential
profits in the future is part of what is driving the intense push
toward concentration in control over germ plasm now
occurring.
Other shifts may follow
The negotiating power of seed firms could well have other
impacts.
•  In an effort to control the germ plasm more completely,
seed companies are likely to negotiate for ownership of the
product with the producer under contract having only a contract
right to payment, short of ownership of the crop or livestock
involved.
•  Similarly, the contract may contain what would appear at
first glance to be an attractive feature—the input supplier
bearing the price risks.
These seemingly innocent shifts would mean, however, that
the economic position of the producer would be transformed
from that of a risk-taking entrepreneur into a relatively riskless
world of fixed compensation.  Thus, a shift not only of
compensation would occur in favor of the input supplier but
also a shift of management functions in the same direction.  The
outcome would be reminiscent of the limited role played by
growers under broiler contracts.
Barriers to entry
In general, one would expect high handed economic behavior
by near monopolists to be met by entry of new competitors
attracted by the generous terms of contracts in favor of the input
suppliers.  And that would likely occur if entry were possible.
However, barriers to entry may be fairly high.
•  One barrier is capital needed to mount the kind of research
effort needed to maintain a product flow similar to that of the
firms pressing for monopoly-like concentration levels.  The
capital needed is very substantial.
•  Also, existing patent and plant variety protection may mean
that potential competitors are frozen out of competition as a
practical matter for the duration of the patent or PVP certificate5
(20 years).
•  One possible strategy for farmers is to forge alliances
among producers (which is specifically allowed by federal law
o long as it does not "unduly enhance" price).6  The push to
achieve such countervailing power was the driving force behind
the formation of labor unions a century ago.  Historically,
however, farmers have been unwilling to accept such a
disciplined approach to achieving bargaining power.
Another possible area of protection against a sharp tilt in the
economic terms of contracts is vigilance by federal (or state)
anti-trust agencies.  Certainly the Federal Trade Commission
and th  U.S. Department of Justice should be sensitized to the
potential for economic abuses down the road.  It's been well
established for decades that firms with monopoly power over a
product should not be able to "tie" other products to the
transaction and extend the monopoly position.7  Such
arrangements, which involve tying products over which a firm
does not have monopoly power (such as financing, insurance or
risk management) to a product over which the firm does have
monopoly power (such as a seed variety), are illegal per se
unless it can be demonstrated that the product in monopoly
status wouldn't work as well with other firms' products.  And,
that is rarely the case.  FTC and the Department of Justice
should scrutinize all seed industry mergers carefully for anti-
comp ti ve consequences and all practices by seed companies
in tying credit, insurance, risk management or other needed
inputs to seed availability.  In a 1936 U.S. Supreme Court
decision, IBM was prevented from requiring purchasers of its
calculating machines to buy punch cards for data entry from
IBM.8  Similarly, in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States,9 a seller occupying a "dominant position" in the shoe
machinery industry, without more, violated the Clayton Act10
by con racts tying to the lease of its machines the purchase of
other types of machinery and incidental supplies.  In a 1947
U.S. Supreme Court decision,11 conditioning the leasing of
patented machines for dispensing industrial salt on the lessee's
purch se of the lessor's salt, the court said that it is
"unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market" if the seller enjoys a monopolistic position
in the m rket for the tying product or if a substantial volume of
commerce in the "tied" product is restrained.12
In conclu ion
Agricultural production may never be transformed as
dramatically indicated by the scenario outlined in this article.
But, it’s w ll within the range of feasibility.
In the meantime, the prudent course would suggest careful
evaluation of mergers and alliances now occurring in rapid
succession.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
COTENANTS. The plaintiffs first received the farm property
as remainder holders after a life estate, created in 1968, held by
the plaintiffs’ father. The father received the life estate upon the
death of the plaintiffs’ mother who had received the property
from her parents in 1955. However, the plaintiffs discovered, in
a title opinion in 1996, that the 1955 transfer from the
grandparents to the mother was actually to the mother and
father as tenants in common. Thus, the father owned one-half of
the property in fee and that one-half interest passed, in part, to
other heirs of the father. The plaintiffs sought to clear the title,
arguing that the plaintiffs acquired title by adverse possession
from 1968 to the present action. The plaintiffs actively farmed
the land and paid the taxes. The defendants argued that adverse
possession did not apply between cotenants unless there was an
ouster of one cotenant. The court held that an exception to this
rule applied in that the mother’s will transferred the entire fee,
first as a life estate to the father, and then as a remainder to the
plaintiffs. The court held that the transfer of an entire interest
by the creation of the remainder to the plaintiffs acted as an
ouster of the father’s cotenancy interest, allowing the plaintiffs
to acquire title by adverse possession of the property. This case
was submitted by Roger McEowen, Associate Professor of
Agric. Econ. and Ext. Specialist, Agric. Law and Policy at Kan.
State Univ. Buchanan v. Rediger, __ P.2d __ (Kan. Ct. App.
1999).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor owed taxes for 1985-1988. The
debtor did not file the returns for those years until after the IRS
had made an assessment based on substitute returns constructed
by the IRS. The debtor’s returns used the figures from the
substitute returns. The IRS argued that the discharge of taxes
provision under Section 523(a)(1)(B) did not apply because the
IRS had made an assessment and constructed substitute returns
prior to the debtor’s filing of the tax returns. The Bankruptcy
and District Courts held that Section 523(a)(1)(B) had no
exception for returns filed after assessment. In addition, the
courts held that the returns were valid and were not affected by
the substitute returns constructed by the IRS. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the debtor’s return was not a valid
return because it served no purpose once the IRS constructed
substitute returns and assessed a deficiency In re Hindenlang,
164 F.3d 1029 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’g, 214 B.R. 847 (S.D. Ohio
1997), aff’g, 205 B.R. 874 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
SECURED CLAIMS . The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan
provided that, upon payment of a claim as required by Chapter
13, any lien securing the claim would be released. The plan did
not rovid  for full payment of several tax claims which were
secured by tax liens against the debtor’s residence. The court
held that lien could not be extinguished merely by a provision
in the plan but had to be avoided or modified in an affirmative
ac ion in the bankruptcy case. To the extent a claim is not paid
in full, the security interest survives the bankruptcy discharge
and continues in rem, although the debtor’s personal liability
for the d bt is discharged. In re Deutchman, 228 B.R. 829 (D.
Md. 1998).
The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 7 case. Because the
trustee declared the case a no-asset case, the IRS did not file a
secured claim for employment taxes owed by the debtor. The
debtor received a discharge in that case. The debtor then filed
the current Chapter 13 case and the IRS filed a secured claim
for the same employment taxes. The debtor argued that the
taxes were secured in the first case and, therefore, discharged
under Section 727 because no claim was filed. The court held
that, in the Chapter 7 case, the taxes were nondischargeable,
whether a claim was filed or not; therefore, the tax claim
remained viable in the Chapter 13 case and was still secured. In
re Gust, 229 B.R. 44 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998).
SETOFF. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on April 12, 1996
and filed the debtor’s 1995 income tax return on April 15, 1996,
claiming a refund. The IRS filed a claim for 1990, 1991, and
1992 income tax deficiencies and offset the debtor’s refund by
the amount of the tax claims. The 1990 and 1991 claims were
discharged. The debtor had listed the income tax refund as
exempt property and no creditor challenged the exemption. The
IRS sought retroactive permission to execute the offset. The
court acknowledged that prior decisions were split as to
whether th  offset provision, Section 553(a), or the exemption
pr vision, Section 522(c), took precedence. The court followed
the majority of courts in holding that exempt property was not
subject to the setoff provision and the setoff was not proper.
Although the IRS refusal to return the refund was a violation of
the automatic stay, the court held that the IRS did not need to
return the amount of the 1992 tax claim because that claim was
not disc arged. In re Jones, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,366 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
